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The Supreme Court Sanctions the Conditioning of Financial Aid for College on Draft
Registration: Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group' —
Section 1113 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983, popularly known
as the Solomon Amendment, conditions federal financial aid for higher education on
registering for the draft. 2 The Solomon Amendment excludes violators of the draft
registration laws from Tide IV federal assistance programs.' Pursuant to a congressional
mandate,5 President Carter reactivated draft registration in 1980 by ordering all eighteen
Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group (MPIRG), 104 S. Ct. 3348
(1984).
2 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f) (1982). Section 1113 of the Department of Defense Authorization
Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 748 (1982) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f) (1982)), added a
new subsection to the "Offenses and Penalties" section of the Military Selective Service Act. 50
U.S.C. app. § 451 et seq. (1982). The full text of the Solomon Amendment is as follows:
Section 1113. (a) Section 12 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 462,
is amended by adding after subsection (e) the following new subsection:
(f)(I) Any person who is required under section 3 to present himself for and
submit to registration under such section and fails to do so in accordance with
any proclamation issued under such section, or in accordance with any rule or
regulation issued under such section, shall be ineligible for any form of assistance
or benefit provided under title IV of the Higher. Education Act of 1965.
(2) In order to receive any grant, loan, or work assistance under title IV of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 [20 U.S.C. § 1070 et seq. (1982)], a person who is
required under section 3 to present himself for and submit to registration under
such section shall file with the institution of higher education which the person
intends to attend, or is attending, a statement of compliance with section 3 and
regulations issued thereunder.
(3) The Secretary of Education, in agreement with the Director [of the Selective
Service System], shall prescribe methods for verifying such statements of compli-
ance filed pursuant to paragraph (2). Such methods may include requiring insti-
tutions of higher education to provide a list to the Secretary of Education or to
the Director of persons who have submitted such statements of compliance.
(4) The Secretary of Education, in consultation with the Director, shall issue
regulations to implement the requirements of this subsection. Such regulations
shall provide that any person to whom the Secretary of Education proposes to
deny assistance or benefits under title IV for failure to meet the registration
requirements of section 3 and the regulations issued thereunder shall be given
notice of the proposed denial and shall have a suitable period (of not less than
thirty days) after such notice to provide the Secretary with information and
materials establishing that he has complied with the registration requirement
under section 3. Such regulations shall also provide that the Secretary may afford
such person an opportunity for a hearing to establish his compliance or for any
other purpose.
(b) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to loans, grants, or work
assistance under title IV of the Higher Education Act for periods of instruction
beginning after June 30, 1983.
Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 748 (1982).
3 Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. § 82 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453, at 233-34
(1982).
4 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f) (1982). Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 includes all
federal financial aid for higher education programs including Pell Grants, Supplemental Educa-
tional Opportunity Grants, College Work Study, National Direct Student Loans, Guaranteed Student
Loans, PLUS loans and Student Incentive Grant Programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1070 et seq. (1982) and
regulations thereunder, 34 C.F.R. § 668.22 (1984).
5 Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act empowers the President to require by procla-
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to twenty-one year old males to register with the Selective Service System. 6 In addition,
each male subsequently to reach the age of eighteen was required to register within
thirty days of his eighteenth birthday.' In 1982, in the wake of extensive non-compliance
with the draft registration law, 8 Congress passed the Solomon Amendment in order to
deprive non-registrants of the opportunity to attend college with financial assistance
from the federal government. 9 In addition to disqualifying non-registrants from federal
financial aid programs, the Solomon Amendment requires all financial aid applicants to
submit to their schools a statement of compliance with the draft registration law." Both
the disqualification of non-registrants from financial aid programs and the requirement
that they file statements of compliance with the draft registration law were challenged
in Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group."
In 1982, Minnesota Public Interest Research Group (MPIRG)," seeking to enjoin
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota raising bill of attainder, self-incrimination and other
constitutional challenges." MPIRG alleged that in legislatively depriving non-registrants
of the opportunity to receive federal financial aid for college without judicial process,
the Solomon Amendment violates the Constitution's prohibition against bills of attain-
der." Further, MPIRG alleged that in requiring financial aid applicants to submit state-
ments of compliance with the draft registration law, the Solomon Amendment violates
the fifth amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination.' 5 Although
MPIRG's suit was dismissed for lack of standing," the district court allowed simultaneous
mation the registration of every male citizen and resident alien between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six. 50 U.S.C. app. 453 (1982).
See Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453, at 233-34
(1982).
See id.
The Solomon Amendment's sponsor in the House, Representative Jerry Solomon, estimated
that approximately 700,000 young men had not registered and were thus in violation of the draft
registration law at the time of the introduction of the Solomon Amendment bill. 128 CONG. REC.
H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Solomon).
9 Representative Solomon expressed his intention to offer his Amendment repeatedly to several
governmental benefit programs "until every young man is deprived of any kind of Federal assistance
unless he has obeyed the law and fulfilled his obligation as a citizen ...." Id. In addition, Repre-
sentative Edgar, speaking in opposition, noted that one of the purposes of the Solomon Amendment
was to "punish the individuals who do not register." Id. at H4760. Many of those speaking in favor
of the Amendment expressed their outrage over the fact that young men who did not register were
reaping the benefits of citizenship, but not sharing in the responsibilities of citizenship. See, e.g., id.
at 114757 (remarks of Reps. Mitchell and Montgomery). Supporters of the Amendment in the
Senate expressed these same concerns. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. 54943 (daily ed. May 12, 1982)
(statement of Sen. Hayakawa); id. at 54945 (statements of Sens. Jepsen and Tower).
w 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f)(1), (2) (1982), see supra note 1.
" Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group (MPIRG), 104 S. Ct. 3348,
3352 (1984) (MPIRG).
12 Minnesota Public Interest Research Group [hereinafter MPIRGJ is a student directed non-
profit organization in Minnesota working on issues in the public interest. See MPIRG v. Selective
Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 925, 926 (1). Minn. 1983).
' 3 Id.
' 4 Doe v. Selective Serv, Sys., 557 F. Supp. 937, 941 (D. Minn. 1983) (Doe), rev'd sub non.,
Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group (MPIRG), 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984)
(MPIRG).
35 Id. at 946.
16 MPIRG v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 925, 936 (D. Minn. 1983).
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intervention as plaintiffs of Doe and two other anonymous non-registrants who desired
to attend college, but who could not afford to do so without federal financial assistance."
Later, three additional anonymous non-registrants who were in the same predicament
also were allowed to intervene as plaintiffs, and the case name became Doe v. Selective
Service System. 18
In March of 1983, the district court issued a temporary injunction against the
government's enforcement of the Solomon Amendment." In June of the same year, the
district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits of two of their constitutional
challenges, declaring the Solomon Amendment both an unconstitutional bill of attainder
and a violation of the prohibition against compelled self-incrimination, and issued a
permanent injunction." Thirteen days later, however, on June 29, 1983, the United
States Supreme Court stayed the injunction, allowing the government to proceed with
its enforcement of the Solomon Amendment pending final review by the Supreme
Court. 21 Probable jurisdiction was noted on December 5, 1983. 22 In a six-to-two opinion23
written by Chief Justice Burger, under the name Selective Service System v. MPIRG
(MPIRG), the Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the district court in Doe v. Selective
Service System (Doe), and held that neither the bill of attainder clause nor the self-
incrimination clause had been violated. 24
MPIRG arose out of two politically expedient actions: in response to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the President reactivated draft registration?' and in response
to massive non-compliance with the draft registration law, Congress excluded non-
registrants from eligibility for federal financial aid programs. 26 Under the American
17 MPIRG v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 923, 925 (D. Minn. 1983).
18 Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 937.
19 The district court's temporary injunction against enforcement of the Solomon Amendment
was based on its finding that the plaintiffs had shown a probability of success on the merits of their
constitutional claims, and that they faced irreparable harm by the government's continuing enforce-
ment of the law. Id. at 940-41, 950.
20 The district court's permanent injunction against further enforcement of the Solomon
Amendment was issued in a memorandum order incorporating by reference the findings and
reasoning that it spelled out in issuing its temporary injunction in Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 937. Doe v.
Selective Serv. Sys., No. 3-82, Civ. 1670 (I). Minn. June 16, 1983).
21 Selective Serv. Sys. v. Doe, 103 S. Ct. 3574 (1983).
22 Selective Serv: Sys. v. MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. 522 (1983).
" Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist,
Stevens and O'Connor joined. MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3348. Justice Powell also filed a concurring
opinion. Id. at 3359 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Brennan joined in part. Id. at 3361 (Marshall, J., joined in part by Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun did not participate in the case. Id. at 3359.
" Id. at 3359. In a footnote, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the Solomon
Amendment was also a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
because it discriminated on the basis of wealth. Id. at 3359 n.17. The Court noted that under the
equal protection clause, a law need only have a rational basis for making a wealth classification, and
the purpose of encouraging draft registration constituted that rational basis, Id. In lone dissent on
this issue, Justice Marshall declared that he would have struck down the Solomon Amendment on
equal protection grounds, because he could not find a rational reason for discriminating on the
basis of wealth. Id. at 3368-71 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The district court had decided that it did
not need to reach this issue in light of the fact that it had found the Solomon Amendment
unconstitutional on bill of attainder and self-incrimination grounds. Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 950.
25 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
26 See supra notes 2, 8-10.
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system of government, a challenge to the constitutionality of Congress' action is resolved
by a third governmental action judicial review by the Supreme Court." This article
will ask the question whether the Supreme Court fulfilled its obligation as interpreter
and defender of the Constitution, or whether it avoided the constitutional issues raised,
in yet a third act of political expediency. Analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion in
MPIRG, and comparison with the district court's opinion in Doe, will illustrate that the
Supreme Court deferred resolution of the issues in this case to the legislative and
executive branches, each of which is accountable to the political will of the electorate. 2 g
This note will conclude, therefore, that the Court did not serve as that vital third link
in the system of checks and balances which is the very foundation of the two hundred
year old American experiment in democracy. 29
This note will begin in Section I by tracing first the significance and the Supreme
Court's historical treatment of the bill of attainder clause, and then the significance and
the Supreme Court's historical treatment of the fifth amendment's prohibition against
compelled self-incrimination, as it relates to MPIRG. Section II then will present the
district court's resolution in Doe of these two issues. Next, Section III will lay out the
Supreme Court's resolution in MPIRG of these same issues. Finally, Section IV will
compare and contrast the disparate treatment of the bill of attainder and self-incrimi-
nation clauses by the two courts, and attempt to extract the significance of the Supreme
Court's ruling. Critical analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion on the bill of attainder
and self-incrimination issues in MPIRG will suggest that the district court in Doe was
correct in its decision that the Solomon Amendment violates both constitutional provi-
sions involved, and that the Supreme Court was misguided in reversing Doe. Ultimately,
this article will conclude that the Supreme Court set an unfortunate precedent in its
holding that the Solomon Amendment violates neither the bill of attainder nor the self-
incrimination clause of the Constitution.
My conclusion is founded in the fact that the constitutional scheme of the separation
of powers set up procedural protections of individual rights, which the Supreme Court
traditionally has felt compelled to enforce. This article will attempt to show, therefore,
how a very loose construction of the Solomon Amendment, coupled with an overly strict
reading of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and an overly narrow view
of the prohibition against bills of attainder, has weakened the Constitution's procedural
protection of individual rights.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The Framers desired that the Constitution would serve the dual purpose of estab-
lishing the authority of a central democratic government and limiting the power of such
government." The Framers, wary as they were about tyranny of the majority as well as
tyranny of a minority,"' included in the Constitution and its first ten amendments a
27 The Supreme Court's opinion in MPIRG resolves the plaintiffs' challenge to the legislative
and executive actions involved by declaring the Solomon Amendment neither a violation of the
Constitution's prohibition against bills of attainder nor a violation of the fifth amendment's prohib-
ition against compelled self-incrimination. MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3352.
" See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,445-46 (1965).
" See generally id. at 443-48 (discussing importance of separation of powers doctrine).
" See id. at 443.
31 See id.
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myriad of procedural protections of individual rights against the power of the govern-
ment. The bill of attainder clause and the self-incrimination clause are among these
protections." Both of these safeguards of individual liberties are among the extensive
array of checks and balances found in the Constitution's separation of powers edifice.
The separation of powers doctrine is a structural means by which the Framers
sought to protect the individual against government abuse through a specific distribution
of powers among three co-equal branches of the federal government." Mindful of the
potential for the legislature to take shortcuts through the Constitution's procedural
protections of individual freedoms in the name of governmental efficiency, the Framers
fractionalized power among the three branches, reserving for the legislature the power
only to promulgate laws of general applicability." In the area of criminal justice, the
Framers believed that the politically independent judiciary is better suited than the
politically accountable legislature to render impartial justice in individual cases. 35 The
bill of attainder clause mandates that the impartial courts of the judiciary, accountable
to the rule of law, rather than the legislature which is designed to be influenced by the
pressures of the political will of the electorate, should determine the guilt of, and levy
punishment on, the accused." The bill of attainder clause thereby strengthens the system
of checks and balances which is the foundation of the separation of powers protection
of the individual against legislative abuse."
As the bill of attainder clause protects the individual from unbridled power of the
legislature, the fifth amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination pro-
tects the individual, guilty or innocent, from abuse by the executive branch of govern-
ment." The Framers believed that a civilized system of criminal justice has to be based
on accusatorial rather than inquisitorial principles." That is, in a criminal case, the
burden of proof must be on the prosecution, 4° and the determination of guilt must be
made by an impartial tribunal. Accordingly, the Framers made the judgment that it
would be better for an occasional guilty person to go unpunished than to have a criminal
justice system in which the government could force an individual into the "cruel tri-
32 Id. In Brown the Court noted James Madison's statement that: "ft]he accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elected, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No, 47, at 373-74 ( Madison) (Hamilton ed. 1880)); see also
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,426-29 (1956). ,
as
	
381 U.S. at 442. The Court stated:
The Constitution divides the National Government into three branches — Legislative,
Executive and Judicial. This "separation of powers" was obviously not instituted with
the idea that it would promote governmental efficiency. It was, on the contrary, looked
to as a bulwark against tyranny. For if governmental power is fractionalized, if a given
policy can be implemented only by a combination of legislative enactment, judicial
application, and executive implementation, no man or group of men will be able to




35 Id. at 945.
'6 Id.
' 7 Id. at 444.
3"See Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 426-28.
" Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,7 (1964).
4" Id. at 8.
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lemma" of choosing among self-accusation, contempt and perjury."' Under the fifth
amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination, therefore, the govern-
ment is required to make its case without any pressure on the accused to help the
prosecution." In light of the Framers' desire to protect the individual against the coercive
power of government, the Supreme Court consistently has admonished that the fifth
amendment privilege should be given a liberal interpretation so that it successfully may
protect against the evils that it was designed to prevent."
In the remainder of this section, the Supreme Court's historical treatment of the
bill of attainder clause and the self-incrimination clause will be traced. Part A will
concentrate on the Court's definition of bills of attainder, and the tests that the Court
has formulated for applying the elements of that definition to specific cases. Part B will
focus on the Court's historical interpretation of the fifth amendment's privilege against
compelled self-incrimination, and the applicability of the components of that interpre-
tation to situations, such as that created by the Solomon Amendment, where individuals
are required by Congress to submit to the government written answers to potentially
incriminating questions.
A. The Supreme Court's Historical Treatment of the Bill of Attainder Clause
Article I , section 9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution establishes a limit on
the power of Congress: "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."'" A
bill of attainder is a law which legislatively, and without judicial process, determines guilt
and inflicts punishment on an identifiable person or group." The bill of attainder clause
prevents the legislature from doing what the courts were set up to do — adjudicate
individual cases and levy individual punishment." As such, the bill of attainder clause is
a vital ingredient in the separation of powers doctrine, which is one of the organizing
principles on which the federal government is formed.° The Constitution's Framers,
the Supreme Court has found, intended Congress to pass laws of general applicability
under which the courts must try people whom the executive branch brings before them
for prosecution." Whereas Congress possesses full legislative authority, the task of ad-
judication is left to the courts."
The first definitive rulings on the bill of attainder clause by the Supreme Court
came during the period following the Civil War known as Reconstruction, when legis-
lators attempted to punish former adversaries in the war. 5° The Court took this occasion
4 ' See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); see also Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 427.
42 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8.
43
 See, e.g., Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 426-28.
44 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
" Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977).
46 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
47 Id. at 442-43.
"Id. at 446.
49 Id. at 461.
During the period of Reconstruction, which immediately followed the end of the Civil War,
the northern Republicans in Congress used their considerable power and influence to punish people
who had participated in the Rebellion against the Union. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333
(1867), and its companion case Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) (discussed infra
in text accompanying notes 51-58), are exemplary. In Garland, the Court invoked the bill of
attainder clause to strike down a statute which excluded from practice before the federal bar those
lawyers who would not, or could not, take a loyalty oath to the Union. Id. at 381.
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to strike down laws which made an individual's entry into certain occupations illegal,
absent the taking of a loyalty oath. 51 In Cummings v. Missouri, 52 for example, the Court
struck down a law denying entrance into the priesthood to people who could not, or
would not, swear to past and present allegiance to the Union in a loyalty oath." In doing
so, the Court first formulated a three-element definition of a bill of attainder as a law
which legislatively, and without judicial process, determines the guilt of and levies pun-
ishment on an identifiable person or group." The Cummings Court observed that a
specific group deemed disloyal by the legislature had been singled out for punishment
by that legislature, without the protections of a judicial trial." Accordingly, the Court
found a violation of the bill of attainder clause. 56
Having found present all three elements of the bill of attainder prohibition, the
Cummings Court proceeded to address and reject the idea that the law's escapability —
by the taking of the loyalty oath — defeated the constitutional challenge. The Court
considered this notion of escapability, which suggests that if a member of the specified
group singled out for punishment were able to take herself out of that group — here,
by taking the prescribed loyalty oath — the law might be legitimate regulation of future
conduct rather than improper legislative punishment of a group singled out for past
conduct, because the person who took the loyalty oath would no longer be a member of
the specified group, nor would she suffer any punishment.'" . The Court ruled, however,
51 See, e.g., Cummings, 71 U.S. at 316, 332 (the Court struck down a state law which denied
access to the priesthood to people who did not take a loyalty oath to the Union); Garland, 71 U.S.
at 381 (the Court struck down a federal statute which denied access to the federal bar to lawyers
who did not take a loyalty oath to the Union).
52 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
53 Id. at 323.
" Id. at 320-25.
" Id. at 325.
5" Id. at 320.
"Id. at 324-25. Escapability of a statute means that a member of a group punished by the
statute can avoid the punishment by refraining from engaging in the prohibited conduct. By
definition, therefore, if a statute actually punishes a person for a past and ineradicable act, the
statute is not escapable. If, however, the legislature passes a law of general applicability, as it is
constitutionally obliged to do, the statute will merely regulate present and future conduct. Its
punishment, therefore, can be avoided — or escaped — by a person who does not engage in the
prohibited conduct, or who ceases to engage in that conduct.
This notion of the escapability of a statute's deprivation has been raised occasionally by the
government as a defense w bill of attainder challenges. See, e.g., id. In Cummings, the Court rejected
the contention that a law's escapability means that future acts are being regulated rather than past
acts punished, and therefore the Court rejected the notion that escapability defeats the specificity
element of the bill of attainder clause. The Cummings Court tried to put the escapability defense to
rest by also holding that escapability does not defeat the punishment element in bill of attainder
analysis. Id.
Nevertheless, the idea that escapability may defeat a bill of attainder challenge did enjoy a
short period of success. In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 88
(1961), for example, the Court considered escapability as one factor in determining whether a
specific group had been singled out for punishment. Id., construed in Brown, 381 U.S. at 457 n.12.
In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950), the Court considered
escapability as one factor in analyzing the punishment element of the bill of attainder clause. Id.,
construed in Brown, 381 U.S. at 457 n.12. The Brown Court, however, summed up this brief period
of limited success in the government's assertion of the escapability defense by severely narrowing,
if not eliminating, the scope of the defense. Brown, 381 U.S. at 457. The Brown Court criticized the
use of the defense, declaring that it flew in the face of the Court's holding in Cummings. Id. The
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that the constitutional separation of powers consists not of technicalities which semant-
ically can be eluded, but of strict procedural safeguards to which the government must
always adhere, if the provisions arc to accomplish what the Framers intended. 58
The second major set of bill of attainder cases to reach the Supreme Court arose
out of the post World War II Cold War period known as the McCarthy Era. 55 In United
States v. Brown, 6° a typical case generated by the political climate of the era, the Supreme
Court again was faced with legislative attempts to bar those it branded disloyal — this
time suspected communists — from occupations of their choice. 61 The Brown Court
found that in passing legislation forbidding communists from becoming officers in labor
unions, Congress legislatively singled out a specified group for punishment without
judicial process, and, thus, impermissibly violated all three elements of the bill of attain-
der prohihition. 62
 Once again the Court reaffirmed the maxim that the separation of
powers doctrine, as enforced by the bill of attainder clause, prohibits Congress from
singling out for the deprivation of rights those it deems disloyal to the nation, without
affording them the protections of a judicial trial." Observing that the Framers included
the bill of attainder clause in the Constitution at a time when legislative determination
of guilt and infliction of punishment commonly was used against people deemed disloyal
by the legislature,64 the Court noted that, when determining whether or not a bill of
attainder exists, it must continue to look at the circumstances surrounding the enactment
of the challenged legislation to see if the legislature is engaging in this type of persecu-
tion.65
Court went on to declare that escapability is not, in fact, a legitimate defense to a bill of attainder
challenge. Id.
58 Cummings, 71 U.S. at 322-25. The Cummings Court had the following to say about its holding
that escapability does not take a law, which is otherwise a bill of attainder, out of bill of attainder
danger:
[B]ills [of attainder] may inflict punishment absolutely, or may inflict it conditionally.
The legal result must be the same, for what cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly. The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows .... It intended
that the rights of the citizen should be secure against deprivation for past conduct by
legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised.
And further, if these clauses had declared that all such priests ... should be held
so guilty, and be thus deprived, provided they did not, by a day designated, do certain
specified acts, they would be no less within the inhibition of the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 324-25.
59 During the Cold War period following World War II, as during Reconstruction, the Court
was faced with legislative attempts to deprive those deemed disloyal of the rights that others enjoyed.
The now infamous McCarthy hearings, which added fuel to the fire of Cold War paranoia, also
spawned legislative action aimed at depriving alleged "subversives" of the rights enjoyed by "other"
Americans. The cases which reached the Supreme Court during and soon after this period often
addressed these controversies on bill of attainder grounds. See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (the Court
struck down a law which made it a crime for a communist to serve as an officer in a labor union);
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1996) (the Court struck down a federal statute which barred
government pay to federal employees who were communists).
6° 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
61 Brown, 381 U.S. at 438.
"Id. at 461.
6' See id. at 461-62.
"See, e.g., id. at 447; Cummings, 71 U.S. at 322.




In Nixon v. Administrator of General Seruices, 66 its most recent major explication of the
bill of attainder clause, the Supreme Court summarized its historical analysis of this
constitutional protection and reaffirmed the relevance of the context of the law's passage
to the specificity and punishment elements of the bill of attainder prohibition. In applying
this historical analysis to the political milieu of the Watergate scandal, the Court rejected
former President Nixon's claim that congressional legislation authorizing the Adminis-
trator of General Services to preserve his presidential papers and tapes violates the bill
of attainder clause.° The Nixon Court looked for, but failed to find, the first element of
a bill of attainder — the legislative determination of guilt without judicial process — in
the language of the statute itself. 68 On the other hand, in failing to find the second and
third elements of the bill of attainder clause — the legislative infliction of punishment
and the singling out of a specified person or group — the Court found it necessary to
turn to the extrinsic political circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute in
question. 69
The Nixon Court abstracted from its precedent a three-prong test for determining
the existence of the second element — legislative punishment. Each prong inquires into
the political circumstances surrounding the adoption of the bill of attainder clause and
the political quandary surrounding the enactment of the law in question." The Court
declared that the punishment element of the bill of attainder prohibition exists if the
challenged deprivation falls within the historical meaning of "legislative punishment," if
it reasonably cannot be said that the deprivation has "non-punitive legislative purposes,"
or if the legislative history "evinces an intent to punish." 71 As a result, in order to resolve
the punishment element of a bill of attainder challenge, courts must muse the historical
ethos of the authors of the bill of attainder clause as well as consider the temperament
of the specific legislature which enacted the statute at issue. 72
The first inquiry of the three-prong test for the determination of whether a statute
constitutes the infliction of legislative punishment, as prohibited by the bill of attainder
clause, focuses mainly on what the Supreme Court previously has held to be within the
ambit of prohibited "legislative punishment." 75 The Nixon Court noted that bills of
attainder historically have included punishments such as death, imprisonment or the
confiscation of property. 7" The Court further noted that it previously had extended the
definition of legislative punishment in its bill of attainder analysis to include interference
with a person's occupational choice. 75 Though concluding that the preservation of former
President Nixon's presidential records could not be construed to fall within the historical
definition of legislative punishment, the Court explicitly stated that none of its opinions
should be read to preclude future findings that new deprivations formulated by the
legislature also may violate the bill of attainder clause. 76
66 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
67 See id. at 468-80. The Nixon Court reaffirmed the definition of a bill of attainder as a law
which legislatively, and without judicial process, determines guilt and levies punishment on an
identifiable person or group. Id.
'" See id. at 468.
69 See id. at 471-84.
70 Id. at 473-84.
7 ' Id. at 973,975-76,478.
72 See id. at 468-84.
7 ' Id. at 473-74.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 474.
76 Id. at 475.
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As the Court in its historical inquiry focuses on the Framers' intent in banning bills
of attainder, in the two remaining inquiries in the three-prong legislative punishment
test — the consideration of non-punitive legislative purposes and the search of the
legislative history for a motive to punish — the Court contemplates the political envi-
ronment in which the challenged statute was passed." After assessing the particular
economic and political status of former President Nixon, and after considering the
deprivation to which he was subjected by Congress, the Nixon Court found legitimate
non-punitive legislative purposes, but found no legislative motive to punish. 78
The inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the law and those persons that the
law affects also sheds light on the determination of the third prohibited element — that
of specificity. In analyzing this third element of bills of attainder — the singling out of
an identifiable person or group for deprivation of certain rights — the Court also looks
to the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute. This element, called the
specificity requirement, will be met, the Court has held, if the person to be deprived is
singled out either by name or by description of such person's past actions. 79 Consequently,
under the Nixon Court's formulation, both the legislative attitude at the time of the law's
passage and the political status of the person named or described are essential facts in
deciding that the specificity element is or is not met. 80
" See id. at 471-73,475-84 (construing Broom, 381 U.S. at 448-49, and Cummings, 71 U.S. at
320).
It should be noted, however, that in Nestor v. Flemming, 363 U.S. 603,619 (1960), the Court
held that the denial of Social Security benefits to deported aliens did not constitute punishment in
terms of the bill of attainder clause. Id. This raised the question of whether the nature of the
deprivation to which Congress subjects an individual is determinative of the punishment element.
The Nestor Court emphasized, however, that it could find no punitive motive in the congressional
action. Id. Moreover, the Court explicitly relied on the Cummings Court's ruling that prohibited
punishment, rather than legitimate regulation, exists, when the law in question is designed to
"'reach the person, not the calling. — Id. at 614 (quoting Cummings, 71 U.S. at 320). In Nestor, the
Court ultimately found that, under Cummings, the challenged law was a valid regulation of the
Social Security System's disbursement of non-contractual governmental benefits, and was not pro-
hibited punishment of a specific person or group. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 616-17.
In Nestor the Court focused on congressional motive, not on the nature or severity of the
benefit denied, in determining whether the legislation in question violated the bill of attainder
clause. Nevertheless, doubts seemed to linger until the Brown Court reiterated the declaration by
the Cummings Court that Itlhe deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may
be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this
fact. — Brown, 381 U.S. at 448 (quoting Cummings, 71 U.S. at 320). Furthermore, in Nixon, its latest
major application of the bill of attainder clause, the Court resoundingly reaffirmed this Cummings-
Brown line of reasoning emphasizing the punitive intent of Congress, rather than the nature and
extent of the punishment, as the major criterion for determining whether or not the bill of attainder
punishment element is met in a given case. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468-84.
78 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475-84.
79 See id. at 471-72; see also Brown, 381 U.S. at 461.
80 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 469-72. Although the challenged statute referred to Nixon by name,
the Court held that the specificity element was not met because Congress' intent was not to single
out Nixon, per se, but to prevent any president, former, present or future, from disposing of
valuable presidential documents in his or her possession. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. Nixon, coinciden-
tally, had been the only president to date to threaten such action. Id. The Court added, however,
that even if the specificity element had been satisfied, the statute was not an impermissible bill of
attainder because the legislative determination of guilt element and the punishment element had
not been satisfied. Id.
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It thus seems clear that the bill of attainder clause, which prohibits Congress from
determining guilt and inflicting punishment on an identifiable group of persons without
judicial process, is to be applied broadly by the Supreme Court. Although the legislative
determination of guilt absent judicial process element is determined by assessing the
language of the challenged statute itself, the punishment and specificity •elements are
decided in light of relevant historical and political considerations. The punishment
element, especially bound up in a necessary judicial inquiry into the political motives of
the legislators, has been refined by the Court into a finely tailored, easy to apply, three-
prong test. In sum, regardless of any speculative ability of a person to escape the
punishment implemented by a law, if that law contains all three elements of the Supreme
Court's definition of proscribed bills of attainder — legislative determination of guilt
absent judicial process, punishment and the singling out of a specified person or group
— the reviewing court is obliged to apply forcefully the broad prohibition and strike
down the law as violative of the Constitution."
R. The Supreme Court's Historical Treatment of the Self-Incrimination Clause
The fifth amendment to the Constitution mandates that "no person ... be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."" The Supreme Court has inter-
preted this prohibition against. compelled self-incrimination to apply to all governmental
proceedings, be they criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adju-
dicatory." Two main issues generally are involved in a fifth amendment challenge to a
statute: whether the information required is incriminatory," and whether such infor-
mation is compelled. 85
In analyzing the incrimination component, the Supreme Court has interpreted
broadly the fifth amendment privilege to encompass any disclosure which the person
reasonably may believe could he used against her in any criminal prosecution, or which
merely may lead to evidence which could be used in such a criminal prosecution. 56 While
it is often clear when information may or may not be incriminating, the compulsion
component is often the subject of controversy because, as the Supreme Court has
recognized, the meaning of compulsion is more amorphous than that of incrimination."
The confusion is somewhat eased, however, because the Court has given a liberal, though
not specific, interpretation to the compulsion requiremen0'
The Court has described the compulsion component of the privilege against self-
incrimination as the right of a person to remain silent unless that person chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of her own will, and to suffer no penalty for such
gl See supra text accompanying notes 44-80. In no uncertain terms, the Nixon Court reaffirmed
Brown, which likewise had reaffirmed Cummings, stating that 'Brown ... and earlier cases unques-
tionably gave broad and generous meaning to the constitutional protection against bills of attainder."
Nixon, 425 U.S. at 469 (emphasis added).
82 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
" See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
84 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
85 See id.
86 Murphy, 378 U.S. at 94 (White, J., concurring).
" See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496 (1967); Malloy a. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 7
(1964).
88 See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8.
1074	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:1063
silence." The general rule for determining whether or not disclosure is compelled, the
Court has held, is that compulsion occurs where the right to remain silent is made
"costly."" For example, the Court has held that such sanctions for remaining silent as
the denial of government contracts to a private businessperson," the removal of a person
from her job92 or office," and the denial of one's eligibility to practice law94 constitute
compulsion under the fifth amendment. 95 The range of applicability of the privilege to
different types of government proceedings is as extensive as the broad scope of its
incrimination and compulsion components.
The Court has extended the privilege to situations where a government agency
compels the filing of a written form on which incriminating questions are asked. 99 In
Minnesota v. Murphy, 97 though refusing to extend the fifth amendment privilege to
arguably voluntary statements made to one's probation officer, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the principle that where a person is directed to file a governmental form
which asks incriminating questions, that person must silently refuse to file the form in
order to preserve the privilege against compelled self-incrimination." The Murphy Court
referred to a line of cases in which the Court overturned the conviction of gamblers for
refusing to list their illegal sources of income on their tax returns. 99 The government
argued in those cases that gamblers are not compelled to incriminate themselves by the
requirement that they list the source of their income on tax returns because gamblers
are not compelled to engage in illegal gambling.E" The Court rejected this argument as
missing the point.'" The issue, the Court held, is not whether a person could choose
not to gamble, but whether, once a person has chosen to gamble, the government may
compel such person to answer incriminating questions. 102 The Murphy Court stated that
the fifth amendment privilege affords a right not only not to answer incriminating
89 Id.
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967). The Court has held that compulsion exists where
the choice given is between "the rock and the whirlpool." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496. The question to
be asked is whether the person is deprived of the "free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to
answer." Id. The option to lose one's means of livelihood or to be forced to incriminate oneself has
been called by the Court the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent." Id. at 497.
The Court has further defined a "costly" choice in terms of economic coercion. See Lefkowitz
v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82-83 (1973). The Court has extended the protection beyond the loss of
employment to the mere loss of a limited number of contracts in private business. In Turley, the
Court held that the denial of government contracts for five years to a private businessperson was
costly, in terms of sanctions against the right to remain silent, as included in the protection against
compelled self-incrimination. Id. Furthermore, the Court has held that "[a] significant infringement
of constitutional rights cannot be justified by the speculative ability of those affected to cover the
damage." Id. at 84.
9t Turley, 414 U.S. at 83.
92 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
" Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807 (1977).
" Spevack, 385 U.S. at 514.
° See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
9' See Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1149 (1984) (construing Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 66 (1968)).
97 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984).
9' Id. at 1149 & n.8.
" Id.
I" See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51.
'°' Id.
Jo Id.
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questions, but also not to file the form, if the very filing of the form could be incrimi-
nating.'" Accordingly, the Murphy Court noted that a person waives the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination if that person fails to claim the privilege by silently refrain-
ing from filing the form.'"
In sum, the Supreme Court liberally interprets and applies the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. The Court especially is mindful of the compulsory char-
acter of numerous governmental sanctions and the incriminating nature of various
governmental proceedings. The Court, therefore, has extended the broad protections
of the fifth amendment privilege to situations in which the government punishes an
individual's refusal to answer incriminatory written questions on a form which must be
submitted to a governmental agency,'"
II. DOE V. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
Relying on the Supreme Court's historical treatment of the bill of attainder and self-
incrimination clauses, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota ruled
against the government in Doe, holding that the Solomon Amendment violates both the
bill of attainder and the self-incrimination prohibitions in the United States Constitu-
tion. 136 The First part of this section will discuss the district court's finding of an uncon-
stitutional bill of attainder, notwithstanding the government's argument that the Solomon
Amendment is escapable. This section's second part will expound the district court's
finding of compelled self-incrimination in the Solomon Amendment's requirement that
financial aid applicants submit a statement of compliance with the draft registration law.
A. The Bill of Attainder Challenge
In its analysis of the bill of attainder challenge to the Solomon Amendment,'° 7 the
Doe court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon." In particular, the Doe court
applied the historical definition of a bill of attainder as formulated by the Nixon Court, 132
and found in the challenged provision a legislative determination of guilt without judicial
process,im bill of attainder punishment under the three-prong inquiry into the surround-
ing circumstances of the statute's enactment,'" and the singling out of an identifiable
group to receive such punishment. 12 The district court concluded, therefore, that the
statute is an unconstitutional bill of attainder." 3
In applying the first element of the Supreme Court's definition of a bill of attainder
— legislative determination of guilt without judicial process — the district court noted
that the Solomon Amendment deprives all non-registrants of the opportunity to receive
103 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1149 & n.8.
1" Id. at 1149.
105 See supra text accompanying notes 82-104.
106 Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 145-46,150. Doe was reversed in Selective Serv. Sys. v. MPIRG, 104 S.
Ct. 3348 (1984). See infra text accompanying notes 178-223.
'°' See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 941-50.
109 See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
110 Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 943.
111 Id, at 943-45.
"2 Id. at 942.
13 Id. at 945-46.
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federal financial aid for college.'" This is so, the court found, even though conviction
under the draft registration law requires a judicial finding of a knowing failure to
register." 5 The court concluded, therefore, that because non-registered financial aid
applicants are denied financial aid whether or not they have been found by a court to
possess the requisite intent to violate the draft registration law, Congress legislatively
determined the guilt of these non-registrants without the protections of a judicial trial." 6
Having found a legislative determination of guilt without judicial process, I L7 the district
court proceeded to analyze the challenged statute in terms of the punishment and
specificity elements of the bill of attainder prohibition." 8
In addressing the specificity element of the bill of attainder challenge, the district
court reiterated that the Solomon Amendment would meet this requirement if it either
named the group to he deprived of financial aid, or if it specifically described such a
group in terms of that group's past conduct." 9 The plaintiffs in Doe contended that the
statute singles out the identifiable group composed of all draft-aged men who have
violated the draft registration law. 120 The government countered with the argument that
the specificity requirement is not met because the deprivation is escapable by late reg-
istration. 121 Because applicants may avoid the denial of financial aid by registering late
for the draft, the government asserted, the future conduct of non-registration by the
unidentifiable group of men who will fail to register is at issue rather than the past
conduct of presently non-registered men.' 22
In ruling that the statute meets the specificity element of the bill of attainder
prohibition, the district court rejected the government's arguments that the punishment
is escapable, and that this asserted escapability would defeat the specificity require-
ment. 123 The court noted that to receive financial aid under the Solomon Amendment
an applicant must comply with the draft registration law by registering for the draft
within thirty days of his 124 eighteenth birthday.' 25 Because there are no means by which
an applicant can comply with the registration law once this thirty-day period expires,
the court concluded, the Amendment's punishment cannot be escaped.' 2h The Doe court
found, therefore, that the identifiable group of men who have violated the draft regis-
tration law by failing to register for the draft within thirty days of their eighteenth
birthdays are singled out for their past conduct, and the Solomon Amendment thereby
meets the specificity element of the Supreme Court's definition of an unconstitutional
bill of attainder.I 27




118 Id, at 943-45.
119 1d. at 941 n.l.




124 The male pronoun will be used in all instances when referring to the Solomon Amendment
because the draft registration law applies only to men. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83
(1981) (the Court upheld the all-male, peacetime draft registration law).
125 Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 942.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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The district court went on to rule that even if it had accepted the government's
escapability construction, the Solomon Amendment would still violate the specificity
element.'" The court found that, regardless of whether the Solomon Amendment is
escapable by late registration, the law lacks bona fide financial or academic criteria which
might refute the premise that Congress sought to single out non-registrants for the
denial of eligibility for federal financial aid programs, 129 The court concluded, therefore,
that the clear intent of the Solomon Amendment is to reach those who have already
failed to register for the draft in compliance with the law.'" The court continued by
criticizing the circularity of the government's argument that an otherwise unconstitu-
tional law becomes constitutional simply by violators refraining from violating 4.131
Furthermore, the district court noted that the Supreme Court long ago rejected the
notion that escapability is an absolute defense to a finding that the legislature had singled
out a specific group for legislatively found guilt and legislatively assessed punishment. 132
Having concluded that the Solomon Amendment legislatively determines the guilt of a
group singled out for past conduct,'" the district court moved to the remaining issue in
bill of attainder analysis — legislative punishment, 134
In analyzing this legislative punishment element, the district court turned to the
three-prong inquiry for finding punishment set out by the Supreme Court in Nixon. 135
Arguing that no punishment was present in Doe, the government first contended that
the deprivation of financial aid for college does not fall within the historical definition
of "legislative punishment" because the Supreme Court has never so held.'" The district
court rejected this argument, noting that the Supreme Court has not precluded the
possibility of the legislature fashioning new punishments that would violate the bill of
attainder clause. 137 Furthermore, the district court reasoned, the deprivation of one's
opportunity to attend college is analogous, in modern society, to the closing of certain
occupations to that person.'" The court accordingly concluded that because the Supreme
Court has found the denial of the opportunity to enter the occupation of one's choice
an example of bill of attainder punishment, especially when the person is excluded due
to a legislative determination of "disloyalty," the Solomon Amendment fits within the
128 See id.
129
' 30 Id. The court relied on Cummings, 71 U.S at 320, where the Supreme Court had declared
the provision denying "disloyals" entrance into the priesthood an unconstitutional bill of attainder
because it had found that the provision was passed "in order to reach the person, not the calling.
It was exacted, not from any notion that the several acts designated indicated unfitness for the
callings, but because it was thought that the several acts deserved punishment .. „" Id. In the
absence of any bona fide academic or financial criteria in the Solomon Amendment, the district
court concluded that it too was passed in order to reach the person, rather than to legitimately
regulate Title IV educational funding. Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 942.
131 Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 942. The court explained: "To say that plaintiffs can escape the section's
prohibitions by simply registering is to say that an allegedly unconstitutional law becomes valid by
its mere enforcement .. Id.
' 12 Id.
I" Id. at 942-43.




18 Id. at 944.
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historical definition of legislative punishment, and thereby satisfies the first inquiry of
the three-prong punishment element test. 158
The government further argued that, under its asserted construction of escapability,
the Solomon Amendment is an encouragement to register for the draft rather than a
punishment for not registering.' 40 As such, the government continued, the Solomon
Amendment constitutes deterrence rather than retribution, and therefore does not fall
within the Supreme Court's historical definition of "legislative punishment."' 41 The court
rejected this argument, declaring that deterrence has always been one of the most
important aspects of any type of punishment, including what historically has been defined
as legislative punishment, as forbidden by the bill of attainder clause."2
Arguing under the second prong of the punishment test — the "non-punitive
legislative purpose" inquiry — the government again contended that the escapable
Solomon Amendment is meant to encourage draft registration rather than punish non-
registration,"5 and therefore, it has a legitimate non-punitive purpose. 144 The district
court rejected this recurring escapability argument, noting again that deterrence is an
inherently punitive measure.' 45 To subscribe to the argument that the statute should be
upheld because it seeks to encourage certain conduct rather than punish the opposite
behavior, the court reasoned, would be to render the bill of attainder clause meaning-
1,55.. 146
After rejecting the government's escapability argument, the court further found
that the Solomon Amendment promotes both the aims of deterrence and retribution,
and applies to conduct already a crime and already punishable." 7 In addition, the court
found that the Amendment assumes the guilty intent of non-registrants and imposes a
deprivation on them." 8 Notwithstanding the government's escapability contention, there-
fore, the district court held that this second prong of the punishment element test is
met because a non-punitive legislative purpose could not be found. 149
Moving to the third possible definition of punishment under the Supreme Court's
three-prong punishment test, the Doe court looked to the legislative history of the
Solomon Amendment to determine if such history "evinced an intent to punish" non-
registrants.'" The district court acknowledged the remarks of the bill's sponsors in the
House and the Senate — Representative Solomon, after whom the law was named, and
Senator Hayakawa. 151 The court observed that both men had expressed their outrage at
the fact that young men who refused to live up to their responsibilities as citizens by not




142 Id. at 944-45.
149 Id. at 944.
144 Id.
P" Id. at 994-45.
' 46 Id.
147 Id. at 949.
' 48 Id.
149 Id. at 944-45.
1 " Id. at 995.
151 Id.
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aid for college.' 52 In these remarks, as well as in those of other Congresspersons, the
district court found a clear intent to punish non-registrants.'"
Under all three inquiries of the three-prong punishment test, therefore, the district
court found the deprivation of the Solomon Amendment to be the type of punishment
prohibited by the bill of attainder clause.'" Because the court also found that the
Solomon Amendment legislatively, and without judicial process, determines the guilt of
a specified identifiable group for that group's past conduct, the court held the Solomon
Amendment an unconstitutional bill of attainder.'"
B. The Self-Incrimination Challenge
After finding an unconstitutional bill of attainder, the district court in Doe turned
to the compelled self-incrimination challenge to the Solomon Amendment's requirement
that a financial aid applicant submit a form of compliance with the draft registration law
in order to receive financial aid. Initially, the district court ruled that, in light of the
historically liberal interpretation that the Supreme Court has given to this privilege, the
fifth amendment applies to the financial aid application procedure whereby applicants
must file draft registration compliance forms. The district court noted that, according
to the Supreme Court, the privilege is applicable to all governmental proceedings,
including those in which a person is required to submit written answers to incriminating
questions. 156 The district court acknowledged that for the statute to violate the fifth
amendment both the incrimination and compulsion components of the privilege would
have to be found. 157 Although the district court was faced again with the government
asserting that escapability defeats the components of the constitutional challenge, the
court found both incrimination and compulsion, and therefore declared the statute
unconstitutional on fifth amendment grounds.'"
The district court first addressed the incrimination component of the fifth amend-
ment privilege as it applies to the non-escapable Solomon Amendment, and as it would
apply to what the government suggested is an escapable Solomon Amendment. Under
its own interpretation of the statute as inflicting non-escapable punishment, the Doe court
found that a financial aid applicant who has not registered for the draft on time is
required to disclose to the government that he is in violation of the law.' 59 Even if an
applicant were allowed to refuse to file the compliance form, the district court reasoned,
because the government's major problem in enforcing the draft registration law is
identifying the 700,000 individual violators, the very act of claiming the fifth amendment
privilege in refusing to file the form would bring attention to a person as a violator of
the law, thereby providing the government with the identification link in the prosecution's
case.'" The court held, therefore, that whether a non-registered financial aid applicant
I." Id.
163 1d.
," Id. at 945-46.
", Id. at 946.
"6 Id. at 946-47.
1571d
"8 Id. at 950.
Id. at 947.
,60 Id. at 948.
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files the compliance form or conspicuously refuses to file the form, he has incriminated
himself, or, at the very least, he has identified himself as a possible violator of the law. L61
If it were to have accepted the government's escapability argument, the district court
noted, the result would have been no different.' 62 The district court pointed out that
even if the Solomon Amendment is escapable — allowirtg late registration for the limited
purpose of receiving financial aid — the draft registration law itself, which requires
registration within thirty days of a man's eighteenth birthday, does not allow a person
to escape felony conviction and punishment by registering late.' 65 The court noted that
the very act of late registration, which would be required to obtain financial aid under
an escapable Solomon Amendment, demands that a registrant provide the Selective
Service System with his birthdate and registration date — two of the facts needed to
prosecute a violator of the draft registration law.' 64 The court concluded, therefore, that
no matter how the Solomon Amendment is construed, incriminating information would
have to be disclosed to the government by all previously non-registered financial aid
applicants.' 65
Having found incrimination in the Solomon Amendment's requirement that an
applicant submit a draft registratio.
 n compliance form, the district court moved to the
compulsion component of the fifth amendment privilege. The district court noted that
the Supreme Court has consistently provided a liberal interpretation of compulsion.' 66
In Doe, the government argued that the necessary compulsion is absent because non-
registrants are not compelled to seek financial aid for college from the federal govern-
ment.'" According to the government, non-registrants, therefore, are not compelled to
incriminate themselves under the Solomon Amendment, which applies only to legitimate
financial aid applicants.' 68 The district court rejected this argument, reasoning that the
issue is not a person's decision not to register and to apply for financial aid, hut, once a
person has so decided, whether the government constitutionally may require him to
incriminate himself. 169 The court drew an analogy to cases where the Supreme Court
decided that gamblers may not be convicted for failing to file tax returns where the tax
forms inquired into the illegal sources of the gamblers' income.'" In those cases, the
district court noted, the Supreme Court rejected the government's argument that the
defendants were not compelled to incriminate themselves because they were not com-
pelled to gamble illegally in the first place.I 71
The district court further relied on the Supreme Court's holding that there is
compulsion under the fifth amendment where the right to remain silent is made
"costly." 172 The Doe court reasoned that the deprivation of a college education in modern
America is as costly as many of the deprivations that the Supreme Court historically has
161 Id. at 947-48.
162 See id.
165 See id. at 942, 948; see also infra notes 254 & 259.
164 See Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 942, 948.
165 Id. at 948.












held unconstitutional sanctions for the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege. 173 The
Supreme Court has held, as the court pointed out, that the removal from one's job, and
the denial of the opportunity to practice law are examples of unconstitutional penalties
for the right to remain silent) 74 Because the denial of a college education can produce
the same result, the Doe court concluded, it too is such an unconstitutional sanction.' 75
Although the district court specifically stated that the draft registration law itself is
valid, and therefore should be followed and enforced, the court found itself obliged to
strike down the additional method of enforcement chosen by Congress — namely, the
Solomon Amendment — because the Amendment infringes on the fifth amendment
privilege of the plaintiffs. 176 Having found that the information required to be disclosed
under the scheme of the Amendment was both incriminating and compelled, the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota declared the Solomon Amendment an
unconstitutional violation of the fifth amendment's prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination. ' 77
ill. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM V. MPIRG
The Supreme Court in MPIRG reversed the decision of the district court in Doe.
The first part of this section will focus on the Court's bill of attainder analysis and its
holding that neither the punishment nor the specificity element of the bill of attainder
clause is satisfied. The second part will focus on the Court's resolution of the fifth
amendment claim and its finding that neither the incrimination nor the compulsion
component of the privilege is met.
A. The Bill of Attainder Challenge
On direct appeal the United States Supreme Court overturned, in MPIRG, the
district court's holding in Doe that the Solomon Amendment is an unconstitutional bill
of attainder) ." The Supreme Court held that although Congress had inflicted depriva-
tion on non-registrants without judicial process, 179 the challenged statute is not a bill of
attainder because it does not single out an identifiable group for deprivation, and because
the deprivation is not the type of punishment prohibited by the bill of attainder clause. 180
The Supreme Court's analysis consisted of two steps. First, the Court construed the
Solomon Amendment to be escapable by late registration."' Second, the Court applied
'" Id. at 949.
174 1d. at 948-49.
175 Id. at 949.
'" Id. at 950.
177 hi.
MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3352.
' 79 Id. at 3353 n.3.
180 Id. at 3358. In 114PIRG, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its definition of a bill of attainder as
a law which legislatively, and without judicial process, determines guilt and inflicts punishment on
an identifiable person or group. Id. at 3353; see aLso supra notes 45 & 67 and accompanying text.
The Court rejected, without any discussion, the government's argument that the statute does not
determine guilt without judicial process. Id. at 3353 n.3. The greater portion of the Court's opinion,
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its historical bill of attainder analysis to the specificity and punishment elements and
found that the escapable' 82 Solomon Amendment violates neither.'"
The Supreme Court construed the Solomon Amendment as escapable because
subsection (f)(4) of the Amendment.'" states that an applicant, after being denied aid
due to a finding that he has not registered for the draft, has thirty days to establish that
he has registered before a final determination of ineligibility will be made. 185 The Court
interpreted this provision as a thirty-day grace period during which financial aid appli-
cants may register late, and thereby become eligible for Title IV federal assistance for
college.' 86 Having found that the Solomon Amendment is escapable by late registration,
the Supreme Court proceeded to apply its traditional bill of attainder analysis to the
escapable Solomon Amendment.
The plaintiffs had argued that the statute at issue singles them out as members of
an identifiable group that has violated the draft registration law, thereby meeting the
specificity element of unconstitutional bills of attainder.'" The Supreme Court rejected
this argument,'" and held that beCause the Solomon Amendment is escapable, its pur-
pose is to encourage the future conduct of registration, rather than to punish the past
conduct of non-registration.' 89
 Since the group deprived of financial aid is the as yet
unidentifiable group composed of those who will refuse to register in the future, the
Court reasoned, it could not be said that members of an identifiable group are being
denied anything as a sanction for past actions. 19° The Court concluded, therefore, that
the Solomon Amendment is a legitimate law of general applicability intended to dis-
courage future violation of the draft registration law, rather than to single out for
punishment a specific group for its past illegal conduct.' 9 '
Although the specificity element is not met under the Supreme Court's construction
of the Solomon Amendment, the Court went on to analyze the type of deprivation the
law imposes in terms of the punishment element of the bill of attainder clause. Referring
to the three-prong test of unconstitutional punishment laid down in Nixon, the Supreme
Court noted that it would have to find that the punishment of the statute falls within
the bill of attainder punishment prohibition if the deprivation imposed fits within the
historical meaning of "legislative punishment," if the law reasonably cannot be said to
"further non-punitive goals," or if the legislative history "evinced a congressional motive
to punish."' 92 The Court resolved all three inquiries in the negative, and thus found no
prohibited punishment.'"
'" See supra note 57. Compare supra note 58 and infra note 254.
' 83 MPIRG, 104 S. Cr. at 3358.
184 See supra note 2 and infra note 254.
la 5 M/IRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3354.
1141i Id .
'" Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 992.
l"MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3353-55.
' 89 Id. at 3354-55.
19° Id. at 3355.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 3355-56.
' 93 See id. at 3356-58. Under the Nixon Court's three-prong punishment
affirmative answer to any one of the three inquiries would connote prohibited
supra note 71 and accompanying text. The Court in MPIRG could have ended its








Applying the first prong of the punishment element test, the Supreme Court noted
that prohibited punishment historically has been limited to death, imprisonment or
confiscation of property,'" and that it has extended the bill of attainder clause's coverage
to include the exclusion of people from certain occupations.' 95 The Court concluded
that the Solomon Amendment does not fall into any of these historically acknowledged
forms of legislative punishment. 196 Instead, the Court held, the deprivation of federal
financial aid for college is more like the denial of a mere non-contractual government
benefit, which does not constitute, necessarily, bill of attainder punishment.' 97 Finally,
the Court invoked its escapability construction, and ruled that because the deprivation
is only temporary, rather than permanent, it is too unlike the deprivations that have
been declared unconstitutional in the past to warrant the extension of the bill of attainder
protection to the Solomon Amendment.' 98
The escapability construction surfaced again when the Supreme Court next moved
to its final two punishment element inquiries, as it determined whether the Solomon
Amendment reasonably can be said to further non-punitive goals, and whether the
legislative history evinced a congressional motive to punish. In examining the legislative
history of the challenged statute, the Court found several non-punitive goals which
persuaded it that Congress had not intended to punish.' 9" The Court noted that several
Congresspersons had expressed their concerns for the fair allocation of scarce federal
resources to those who most deserve them, and fciund this a legitimate non-punitive goal
of the statute. 2°" Furthermore, the Court noted a number of remarks by Congresspersons
expressing a genuine desire to encourage draft registration through the new provi-
sions. 20 ' The Court ruled that this too is a valid non-punitive g„1.202 Finally, the Court
noted that the Solomon Amendment deprives innocent, non-intentional violators 2°5 as
well as knowing violators of the draft registration law. 204 The Court therefore concluded
that Congress must have meant to encourage rather than punish because it could not
have intended to punish innocent violators. 215
Hence, the Court accepted the government's contention that the Solomon Amend-
ment merely is meant to encourage draft registration, and not meant to punish non-
registration. In light of this finding, and in light of its conclusion that the specificity
element of singling out an identifiable group is not met, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the United States District Court for the District of
for some reason, to apply its escapability construction to all three punishment tests. For a possible
explanation see infra note 286 and accompanying text.
1" Id. at 3356.
I 99 Id.
'u" Id.
' 91 Id. But see supra note 77.
199 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3356.
I9g
 Id. at 3356-57.
20o Id. at 3357.
201 Id.
"2 Id.
2"3 By "innocent violators" the Court was referring to those non-registrants who did not know-
ingly violate the draft registration law by "willfully" not registering. The government must prove
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Minnesota, and declared that the Solomon Amendment is not an unconstitutional bill
of attainder. 206
B. The Self-Incrimination Challenge
The Supreme Court also reversed the holding of the district court in Doe that the
Solomon Amendment violates the fifth amendment's prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination. 267 The Supreme Court held that the information required by the Solomon
Amendment for an applicant to receive financial aid for college is neither incriminating
nor compelled. 208 The Court ruled, therefore, that the statute does not violate the fifth
amend ment. 2 °g
The Supreme Court found no compulsion in the Solomon Amendment 2 " because
one who does not register for the draft, and is thus ineligible for financial aid, is under
no compulsion to seek financial aid in the first place. 2 u Because a non-registrant is bound
to know that he may not receive financial aid, and because he is not compelled to seek
financial aid, the Court reasoned, non-registrants simply are not compelled to disclose
any information to the government, whether or not the information required by the
Solomon Amendment is incriminatory. 212
Moreover, the Supreme Court found that the information required by the statute
is not incriminatory. 212 The Court noted that the Solomon Amendment requires that a
financial aid applicant submit a statement to his college insuring that he has complied
with the draft registration law, and reasoned that because only draft registrants are
eligible to apply, the statement of compliance can not furnish any incriminating infor-
mation. 2 " Even if late registration takes place by a previously non-registered applicant, 2 "
the Court reasoned, the statement of compliance does not provide any incriminating
information: the statement merely declares that the registration law has been satisfied.'"
Absent incriminatory disclosure, the Court held, there is no violation of the fifth amend-
ment privilege. 2 '
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the plaintiffs' contention that, if the Solomon
Amendment is construed as escapable, a previously non-registered financial aid applicant
has to register late for the draft in order to comply with the Amendment and, therefore,
he must disclose incriminating information to the Selective Service System. 2" The Court
accepted the plaintiffs' assertion that late registration itself is incriminatory because the
disclosure of one's birthdate and registration date are required to complete draft regis-
tration, and because these same facts prove violation of the draft registration law if the
216 Id. at 3358.
207 Id. at 3359.
208 Id. at 3358-59.
2°9 Id.
010 Id. at 3358.
211
212 Id.
213 Id. at 3358-59.
214 Id. at 3358.
"L 5 See supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3358. But see infra notes 298-59 and accompanying text.
2 " MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3358.




government also can prove that the failure to register on time was intentional."' Never-
theless, the Court concluded that it did not need to decide this issue because the plaintiffs
in MPIRG have not registered, and therefore have no occasion even to raise the fifth
amendment privilege as it potentially applies to late registration.22° Not having been
confronted with the incriminating questions of the draft registration form, the Court
held, the plaintiffs cannot raise a cognizable fifth amendment claim. 22 '
Having thus found neither incrimination nor compulsion in the statute's require-
ment that financial aid applicants submit a statement of compliance with the draft
registration law, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Solomon Amend-
ment.222 Having further found that even if the Amendment requires non-registrants to
register late, thereby incriminating themselves, in order to receive financial aid, the
Court ruled that since the plaintiffs in MPIRG had not registered late, they cannot raise
the fifth amendment claim as it relates to the act of late registration. 223 The Court
therefore reversed the holding of the district court.
Justice Marshall, joined by justice Brennan, 224 dissented from the majority's opinion
on the fifth amendment issue. 225 In criticizing the Court's handling of the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination, Justice Marshall assumed arguendo the accuracy
of the escapability construction of the Solomon Amendment which the Court invoked
to save the statute under the bill of attainder challenge. 226 Justice Marshall thus focused
on the fifth amendment issue which was shaped by the Court's escapability construe-
tion. 227
Due to Marshall's assumption that the Solomon Amendment is escapable, he did
not take issue with the Court's holding on the merits that late registrants do not have to
file incriminating statements of compliance with their schools under the Solomon
Amendment. 228 Justice Marshall argued, however, that the act of late registration, which
is compelled by the Court's escapability construction of the statute, requires the disclosure
of incriminating information to the Selective Service Systern. 229 justice Marshall con-
cluded, therefore, that the Court's refusal, apparently on ripeness grounds, to address
the non-registrants' self-incrimination claim based on the danger of registering late, is
unsupportable. 23°
219 Id. at 3358.




224 Id. at 3361 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
325 Id. (Marshall, J., joined in part by Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also dissented
from the Court's cursory rejection of the plaintiffs' equal prol . ection claim. See id. at 3368-71
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also supra note 24.
229 See id. at 3363 (Marshall, J., joined in part by Brennan, J., dissenting).
227 Id. Justice Marshall stated that he did not have to disagree with the Court's bill of attainder
holding because it was based wholly on the Court's construction of the Solomon Amendment as
escapable by late registration. Id.; see also supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text and infra note
245 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall noted, however, that this act of late registration,
required under the Court's statutory construction to defeat the bill of attainder challenge, causes
fifth amendment problems because it involves the disclosure of incriminating information. See
MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3363 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3363 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 3364 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23° See id. at 3364-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Justice Marshall vehemently disagreed with the Court's holding that the plaintiffs'
fifth amendment challenge is not ripe for review. 28 ' He noted that the Court's late
registration requirement is incriminating in two ways. First, it requires the late registrant
to furnish the government with his birthdate and registration date, two of the three facts
necessary for him to be prosecuted for failure to register within thirty days of his
eighteenth birthday. 232 Second, if the late registrant noticeably refuses to answer the
incriminating questions before a cognizable fifth amendment claim may be made, as the
Court requires, 233 such late registrant furnishes the government with the identification
link in the prosecutor's potential case by calling attention to himself as one of the almost
700,000 individual violators.234 Justice Marshall concluded, therefore, that MPIRG
should be controlled by the rule that where vocal assertion of the fifth amendment
privilege itself is incriminating, the only meaningful way to claim the privilege is by
silence 245
Moving to the issue of compulsion — here, created by the Court's escapability by
late registration construction — Justice Marshall argued that the denial of eligibility for
financial aid for college is similar to other forms of economic coercion which have been
struck down in the past, tinder the self-incrimination clause. 238 Surely, he argued, denial
of financial aid to a person who otherwise cannot afford to attend college is no different
a sanction against the right to remain silent than a sanction struck down in a case where
the plaintiff is removed from his job for refusing to answer incriminating questions. 237
Justice Marshall concluded, therefore, that the Court deprived the plaintiffs in MPIRG
of their constitutional right not to be compelled to incriminate themselves. 228 The plain-
tiffs are left with the choice, he found, between losing the opportunity to attend college
for remaining "silent" by not registering for the draft, and incriminating themselves of
a felony by registering late. 238 According to Justice Marshall, this is an unwarranted and
indefensible denial of the plaintiffs' fifth amendment right. 24°
IV. MPIRG: A THIRD Acr OF POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY?
This note now turns to a critical analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion in MPIRG,
which reversed the district court's opinion in Doe. Part A will analyze the Court's bill of
attainder decision, first focusing on its escapability construction of the Solomon Amend-
ment, and then dealing with the Court's application of its precedent to the escapable
Solomon Amendment. Section B will evaluate the Court's resolution of the fifth amend-
ment issue, the focus being on the Court's resolution of the compulsion and incrimination
components of the privilege, and on its resolution of the self-incrimination issue raised
by its escapability construction of the Solomon Amendment. Part C will link the findings
made in Parts A and B that the Court erroneously construed the Solomon Amendment
2" Id. at 3366 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 3364 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
239 Id .
234 Id,
235 Id. at 3366-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
236 Id. at 3365 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
237 Id.
23N
	 at 3367-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23E4 Id.
2 ' 0 Id, at 3367 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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and then spuriously applied its bill of attainder and self-incrimination precedent to the
escapable statute. Ultimately, this note will conclude that the Court, exclusively concerned
with the "correct" result in this case, evaded rather than confronted the constitutional
issues presented, and therefore was misguided in its reversal of the district court's opinion
in Doe.
A. The Bill of Attainder Challenge
Although the Supreme Court in MPIRG reversed the district court's holding in Doe
on the bill of attainder challenge, it reaffirmed the validity of the cases on which the
district court had relied in striking the Solomon Amendment as an unconstitutional bill
of attainder. 241 The Supreme Court's opinion in MPIRC diverged from the district court's
opinion in Doe in two major ways. First, the Supreme Court ruled that the Solomon
Amendment is escapable ;242 whereas the district court found that it clearly is not.24 3
Second, the Supreme Court sanctioned escapability as a defense to the bill of attainder
challenge, notwithstanding the precedent to the contrary which it, as well as the district
court in Doe, cited approvingly. 244 As will be exemplified below, the Court employed a
faulty statutory construction and invoked a strained application of precedent to reach
the result it apparently desired to reach, in spite of the valid constitutional challenges
raised.
241 The Supreme Court cited approvingly the following cases upon which the district court in
Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 941-46, heavily relied in striking the Solomon Amendment on bill of attainder
grounds: Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437 (1965); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333 (1867). MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3353.
242 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 5354.
245 Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 942.
?" For example, the141PIRG Court repeatedly cited Cummings, despite the fact that the Cummings
Court soundly rejected the very escapability argument that the MPIRG Court accepted. For instance,
the Court in Cummings declared:
The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment,
the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this fact.
The theory upon which our political institutions rests is, that all men have certain
inalienable rights — that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;
and that in the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike
open to every one, and that in the protection of these rights all are equal before the
law. Any deprivation or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is punishment, and
can be in no otherwise defined.
Cummings, 71 U.S. at 320-22 (emphasis added). The Cummings Court went on to explain that the
laws under bill of attainder scrutiny were:
aimed at past acts, and not future acts. They were intended especially to operate upon
parties who ... had aided or countenanced the Rebellion ... and they were intended
to operate by depriving such persons the right to hold certain offices and trusts, and
to pursue their avocations. This deprivation is punishment; nor is it any less so because
a way is opened for escape from it ... .
Id. at 327 (emphasis added). In addition, the MPIRG Court approvingly cited Brown, yet ignored
the Brown Court's admonition that the bill of attainder clause be given a liberal interpretation so
that it would implement the separation of powers doctrine, as it was intended to do. Brown, 381
U.S. at 442. Ironically, Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the majority opinion in MPIRG, giving a
narrow interpretation to the bill of attainder protection, wrote a dissent in Nixon, arguing there
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The Supreme Court began its bill of attainder analysis in MPIRG by agreeing with
the district court's opinion in Doe that a non-escapable Solomon Amendment would be
an unconstitutional bill of attainder. 245 The Court proceeded, however, to construe the
Solomon Amendment as escapable. 246 The Court then used this escapability construction
to defeat the specificity element of its bill of attainder definition, as well as to defeat the
punishment element under all three inquiries of its three-prong punishment test."'
Therefore, without the escapability construction, the Supreme Court presumably would
have stricken the statute. Hence, .the soundness of the Supreme Court's decision in
MPIRG rests on the validity of the Court's construction of the Solomon Amendment as
escapable. 248
Close scrutiny of the language of the Solomon Amendment will illustrate a patent
inaccuracy in the Supreme Court's escapability construction. The Court held that the
Solomon Amendment is escapable by late registration notwithstanding that subsection
(f)(1) of the statute states that all persons in violation of the draft registration law are
ineligible for financial aid, 249 and notwithstanding that the draft registration law states
that each male who does not register within thirty days of his eighteenth birthday is in
violation of the law. 25" As the district court noted, late registration, subsequent to this
thirty-day period, is just as illegal as non-registration. 25 ' Therefore, an applicant who
registers for the draft over thirty days after his eighteenth birthday is ineligible for
financial aid under the actual terms of subsection (f)(1) of the Solomon Amendment,
despite his registering late.
Nevertheless, to substantiate its contrary finding that the Solomon Amendment is
escapable by late registration, 252 the Supreme Court relied on subsection (f)(4) of the
Solomon Amendment, which states that an applicant notified of impending denial of
financial aid has thirty days during which to prove that he has registered in compliance
with the draft registration kiW.253 Subsection (f)(4), however, merely gives an applicant
whose registration is disputed the opportunity to prove that he has registered in com-
pliance with the draft registration law, which, in turn, requires registration within thirty
days of his eighteenth birthday. 254 The Solomon Amendment says nothing about a thirty-
245 See MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3352. This is so because without the Court's escapability construction
both the specificity and punishment elements of the bill of attainder challenge are met by the
plaintiffs. Compare supra text accompanying notes 187-91 and supra text accompanying notes 198-
206 with .supra text accompanying notes 128-32 am/ supra text accompanying notes 140-53.
246
	 104 S. Ct. at 3354.
2 ' 1 Id. at 3354-58.
248 Id. at 3363 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
249 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
250
	 supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
291
	 557 F. Supp. at 942.
252 See MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3354.
259
	 supra note 2 and infra note 254.
"'Solomon Amendment, 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f)(4) (1982). In pertinent part, the Amendment
states:
[Ably person to whom the Secretary of Education proposes to deny assistance or
benefits under title I V for failure to meet the registration requirements of section 3
[the draft registration awl . . . shall be given notice of the proposed denial and shall
have a suitable period (of not less than thirty days) after such notice to provide the
Secretary with information and materials establishing that he has complied with the
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day grace period for late registration. 255 On the contrary, subsection (f)( 1) of the statute
excludes, on its face, late registrants from the financial aid programs 2" because late
registration is not valid compliance with the draft registration law. 257
The Court inappropriately read into the statute a thirty-day grace period 2" for the
limited purpose of defeating the bill of attainder challenge. In so doing, the Court
created the absurd situation where late registration, while not constituting valid compli-
ance with the draft registration law, constitutes compliance with the Solomon Amend-
ment, which requires valid compliance with the draft registration law. 259 Because the
Supreme Court stated that its reversal of the district court's opinion in Doe was based
on the escapability of the Solomon Amendment, 20 the Court's opinion in MPIRG is
founded on this erroneous construction of the law. The Court's use of escapability to
defeat both the specificity and punishment elements of its bill of attainder analysis further
evades logic because the Court not only failed to overturn or narrow the contrary
holdings of Cummings or Brown, but reaffirmed them as controlling law. 261
In addition to its fallacious construction of the Solomon Amendment, the Supreme
Court seems to have cut back on the scope of the bill of attainder protection, as set down
in Cummings and Brown, by ruling that escapability does defeat a bill of attainder chal-
lenge. 262 In so doing, the Court appears stubbornly result oriented because the very
authority it purports to rely upon stands for the proposition that escapability defeats
neither the punishment nor the specificity elements of an otherwise successful bill of
registration requirement under section 3. . . Mhe Secretary may afford such person an
opportunity for a hearing to establish his compliance . . . .
Id. (emphasis added). In construing the statute, the Supreme Court erroneously left out the key
words in the Amendment which are emphasized above. See MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3354. Thus, the
Court declared that the Solomon Amendment gave a non-registrant thirty days in which to register
late, rather than thirty days to prove that he had complied with section 3 of the Military Selective
Service Act, which is the draft registration law. Id. Such a. reading of the statute does not merely
strain the meaning of the words used by Congress in the Solomon Amendment, it transforms the
words used.
'" The thirty-day grace period that the Court "found," during which non-registered financial
aid applicants might register hue and thereby receive financial aid, is clearly not in the language of
subsection (f)(4) of the Solomon Amendment. See supra note 254. Moreover, such language is
nowhere to be found in the draft registration law itself. See Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. § 82
(1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453, at 233-34 (1982); see also infra note 259. Rather than find
a way to construe the draft registration law so as to avoid an anomalous result, the Court simply
ignored the inconsistency. See infra text accompanying note 259.
256 See Solomon Amendment, 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f)(4) (1982), supra notes 2 & 254.
257 See Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. § 82 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453, at 233-
34 (1982); see also text accompanying notes 6-7. Ironically, the Court admitted this fact in its fifth
amendment analysis, MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3358, yet misleadingly ignored it in construing the
Solomon Amendment so as to defeat the bill of attainder challenge.
258 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3354.
259 The Solomon Amendment requires compliance with the draft registration law for eligibility
for financial aid. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(f) (1982). To comply with the draft registration law, young
men must register within thirty days of their eighteenth birthdays. Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R.
§ 82 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453, at 233-34 (1982). Therefore, the Court's ruling that
the Solomon Amendment allows for late registration simply does not make sense.
266 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3352.
26 ' Id. at 3353-56; see also infra notes 264-71 and accompanying text.
262 See MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3354-58.
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attainder challenge. 20 For example, the Court approvingly cited Cummings as the foun-
dation of modern bill of attainder law. 264 In Cummings, however, the Supreme Court
unequivocally declared that escapability does not save a statute from bill of attainder
danger.265
The MPIRG Court also relied on Nestor v. Flemming,266 where the deprivation of a
non-contractual government benefit was upheld against a bill of attainder punishment
attack.267 The Court's reliance on Nestor's finding that a non-contractual governmental
benefit does not constitute punishment is misplaced, however, because the holding in
Nestor was based on a different aspect of the case: namely, under the principles set down
in Cummings, the Nestor Court could find no congressional intent to punish. 269 Therefore,
although the MPIRG Court tried to buttress its holding by analogizing financial aid for
college to the non-contractual benefit involved in Nestor, the Court in fact was relying
on its escapability construction in order to find no congressional motive to punish a specific
group. Furthermore, the MPIRG Court approvingly cited Brown, 269 which not only
staunchly reaffirmed the Cummings principle that escapability does not make a difference
in bill of attainder analysis, but also dispelled the notion that Nestor, or any other case,
held that escapability alone can defeat the punishment or specificity elements of a bill
of attainder challenge. 27° Nevertheless, the MPIRG Court used its escapability construc-
tion of the Solomon Amendment as its sole basis for defeating the bill of attainder
clause's specificity requirement, as well as defeating the punishment requirement under
all three prongs of the legislative punishment test. 2"
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the Solomon Amendment does not fulfill
the specificity element of the bill of attainder clause because, the punishment being
escapable, the statute regulates future conduct rather than punishing past conduct. 272
This holding flies in the face of the Cummings and Brown decisions, which both held that
escapability does not defeat the specificity requirement. 275
Furthermore, the Court's own reasoning that the Solomon Amendment serves the
legitimate legislative purpose of allocating scarce federal resources to those who most
deserve them contradicts its holding that the specific group of non-registrants are not
singled out for punishment by the Solomon Amendment. As the Court itself noted, the
263 See infra text accompanying notes 264-73.
264 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3353.
265 Cummings, 71 U.S. at 324-25; see also supra notes 57-58, & 244.
266 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
267 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3356.
268
 See supra note 77.
269 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3353.
27° See supra note 77. In criticizing the notion that escapability defeats the punishment element
because it promotes deterrence rather than retribution, the Brown Court dechired:
It would be archaic to limit the definition of "punishment" to "retribution." Punishment
serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent. — and preventive. One
of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from
inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment.
Historical considerations by no means compel restriction of the bill of attainder
ban to instances of retribution.
Brown, 381 U.S. at 458.
271 See infra text accompanying notes 272-77.
272 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3355.




Cummings Court correctly found the requisite specificity where a statute was designed to
"reach the person, not the calling. "274 Whereas in Cummings the Court invalidated the
attempt to persecute the "disloyal" citizens singled out by a law which had no legitimate
relevance to the calling it was regulating, the MPIRG Court ignored the absence of
authentic financial or academic provisions in the congressional regulation of financial
aid programs, and found it appropriate for Congress to "reach the person[s]" — the
"disloyal" non-registrants — who were deemed unworthy of enjoying the rights of
citizenship. Consequently, the Court's endorsement of escapability to defeat the specificity
element contradicts its own affirmation of controlling precedent.
The Court's analysis of the punishment element of the bill of attainder clause suffers
from the same weaknesses as its specificity analysis. The Court used escapability to answer
in the negative all three of the inquiries in the three-prong punishment test, again
relying on its reading of the Amendment as encouragement to register, rather than
punishment for failure to register. 275 Because the Solomon Amendment — due to its
escapability — is not a permanent deprivation, the Court held, such deprivation does
not fall within the historical definition of legislative punishment. 276 Also as a result of its
escapability construction, the Court found that the Solomon Amendment's encourage-
ment to register is a legitimate non-punitive legislative purpose, and consequently, it
could not be said that Congress possessed a motive to punish. 277 Under all three punish-
ment inquiries, therefore, escapability led the Court to find that no legislative punish-
ment, within the bill of attainder prohibition, is present in the Solomon Amendment.
Even if the escapability construction were defensible, however, its use by the Court to
defeat the punishment requirement can not be reconciled with Cummings and Brown,
both of which held that escapability does not negate the existence of the punishment
prohibited by the bill of' attainder clause. 27 s
If, despite the Court's apparent reliance on authority to the contrary, the rule
established in MPIRG is that a person's ability to avoid the conduct prohibited by a
statute is sufficient to defeat a constitutional challenge to such statute, the Court severely
cut away at the efficacy of the bill of attainder clause, as the district court had warned. 279
MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3353. The Court quoted in part the Cummings Court which had found
a punitive intent because the law in question was designed
in order to reach the person, not the calling. It was exacted, not from any notion that
the several acts designated indicated unfitness for the callings, but because it was
thought that the several acts deserved punishment, and that for many of them there
was no way to inflict punishment except by depriving the parties, who had committed
them, of some of the rights and privileges of the citizen.
Cummings, 71 U.S. at 320. This quote, from which the MPIRG Court extracted some of its punish-
ment element reasoning, cuts against the Court's specificity clement reasoning. It should also be
noted that because identifying the approximately 700,000 individual violators of the draft registra-
tion law is so difficult, the quote from Cummings also cuts against the MPIRG Court's finding that
the Solomon Amendment is nut punitive, in light of the congressional attempt to enforce the draft
registration law through this additional measure.
272 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3356-57.
2" Id. at 3356.
2" Id. at 3356-58.
2" See supra note 244.
2" In addition to destroying the underpinnings of Cummings, the Doe court reasoned, upholding
a law because the plaintiffs may be able to avoid its punishment would render the bill of attainder
clause meaningless. Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 944-45.
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Because MPIRG is founded on a groundless statutory construction and an erroneous
application of precedent, however, it is not clear whether the Supreme Court indeed
narrowed the bill of attainder protection. What is clear, on the other hand, is that the
Court yielded to the legislature the unrestrained power to make the political decision to
deprive those it deems disloyal of the right to seek federal financial aid for college.
Whereas the district court took great pains to separate political considerations from
the constitutional issues presented, 2" by explaining that the procedural safeguards of
the bill of attainder clause were at issue rather than the political wisdom of excluding
people who refuse to register for the draft from financial aid eligibility 2 8 ' the Supreme
Court chose to ignore 282 this judicial obligation. 283
 Instead, the Supreme Court interjected
policy concerns and political sympathies into the case by declaring that the Solomon
Amendment "furthers a fair allocation of scarce federal resources by limiting Title IV
aid to those who are willing to meet their responsibilities to the United States by registering. "284
The Court went on to cite approvingly the . legislative history, in which Congresspersons
advocated the government's political obligation to insure that federal dollars are spent
fairly and prudently on the loyal, rather than on the disloya1. 288 In order to uphold what
it considered a politically desirable statute, the Court first went out of its way to construe
the Solomon Amendment as escapable, although such a construction is not warranted
by the language of the statute, and then misapplied the very cases upon which it
purportedly relied, so as to find the Solomon Amendment constitutional. 286
In deferring to Congress on an issue such as the bill of attainder clause, the Court
abandoned its role as guardian and interpreter of the constitutional protection by ne-
glecting to recognize that the proscription's very purpose is to limit the power of the
legislature through judicial review. 287
 Disregarding the history of the Supreme Court's
application of the bill of attainder clause as the vehicle for enforcement by the courts of
the Framers' desire to protect the unpopular from the power of the representative,
majoritarian branch of government, the MPIRG Court surrendered the fate of modern
"distoyals" to the political whim of Congress.'" The Court even went so far as to agree
with Congress that these "disloyal" young men who failed to register for the draft do
280 See id. at 938-39,950.
28,
 Id.
282 See MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3363 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra note 286.
2" See infra notes 340-45 and accompanying text.
284
 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3357 (emphasis added).
"5 id.
288 See supra text accompanying notes 261-73. Again, it should be remembered that the author
of the MPIRG majority, Chief Justice Burger, wrote in dissent in Nixon, arguing that the majority
in Nixon had improperly refused to apply liberally the bill of attainder protection to former President
Nixon, Nixon, 433 U.S. at 537-38 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Thus, it seems clear that the Chief
Justice was more concerned with the political outcome of these cases than with the consistent and
accurate application of the bill of attainder protection. In other words, Chief Justice Burger was
apparently bothered by Congress' singling out of former President Nixon for specialized treatment,
but not by Congress' singling out of men who refused to register for the draft. Such personal
preferences, however, should have no place in constitutional jurisprudence.
282 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 442-47.
288 Compare MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3357 (Chief Justice Burger narrowly construing the bill of
attainder prohibition), with Nixon, 433 U.S. at 969 (the majority, not including Chief Justice Burger,
broadly interpreting the bill of attainder proscription) and id. at 538 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Chief
Justice Burger advocating an even broader reading of the Constitution's ban against bill of attainders




not deserve the privileges of citizenship. 289 In so doing, the Court refused to enforce some
of the checks and balances that the Framers included in the Constitution to separate the
powers of the federal branches of government. 29° Consequently, the Court necessarily
weakened the protection of individual rights against potential governmental abuse. 293
B. The Self-Incrimination Challenge
In MPIRG, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's holding in Doe that the
Solomon Amendment violates the fifth amendment's prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination. The Supreme Court found neither compulsion nor incrimination in the
challenged statute's requirement that financial aid applicants submit statements of com-
pliance with the draft registration law. 292 Further, the Court held not ripe for review the
plaintiffs' assertion that the escapability of the Solomon Amendment produces its own
fifth amendment problems because late registration itself, required under the escapability
construction, is incriminatory. 295 The appropriateness of the Supreme Court's ruling is
cast in doubt, however, by comparing it to the Doe court's holding, which found com-
pulsion and incrimination in an accurately construed non-escapable Solomon Amend-
ment, and to the MPIRG dissent's criticism of the Court's application of the fifth amend-
ment to the escapable Solomon Amendment.
The Court's initial reason for denying the plaintiffs' fifth amendment claim was its
conclusion that, because non-registrants are not compelled to seek financial aid in the
first place, they are not compelled to disclose any information at all under the Solomon
Amendment.294 In cases cited by the Court, however, this type of rationalization was
rebuked. 295 For example, in Marchetti v. United States'" 6 and Grosso v. United States297 the
government had argued that gamblers are not compelled to disclose the illegal source
of their income on their tax returns because they are not compelled to gamble illegally
in the first place. 295 The Supreme Court rejected this view, stating that the issue is not
2"9 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3357.
291) The bill of attainder clause is the Constitution's procedural enforcement of the separation
of powers axiom that trial by the judiciary rather than by the legislature is proper under the
American system of government. See Brown, 381 U.S at 442-47.
291 See id. Alexander Hamilton described the importance of the bill of attainder clause in the
scheme of the separation of powers doctrine, as follows:
By a limited constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions
to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder
.... Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through
the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary
to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 576-77 (A. Hamilton) (Hamilton ed. 1880), quoted in Brown, 381 U.S.
at 462.
292 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3358-59.
295 Id, at 3359.
Id. at 3358.
295 See supra text accompanying notes 100-102.
296 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
297 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
298 See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51; see also Grosso, 390 U.S. at 62-72 passim (the Court incorporated
in full the reasoning and holding in the companion case of Marchetti); see also supra text accom-
panying notes 100-102.
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whether the plaintiffs could choose not to gamble, but whether, once they have chosen
to gamble, they may be compelled to incriminate themselves." 9 Similarly, the district
court in Doe properly held that the issue is not whether the plaintiffs are compelled to
seek financial aid, but whether, once they have chosen to seek such aid, they may be
compelled to incriminate themselves.sm The Supreme Court in MPIRG, therefore, side-
stepped the issue of compulsion. The real issue of compulsion, as pointed out by the
dissent in MPIRG and the district court in Doe, is whether the deprivation of the
opportunity to attend college is "costly" under the Supreme Court's historical treatment
of sanctions against the right to remain silent. 30
The Supreme Court traditionally has.held that economic as well as physical coercion
creates a costly choice in terms of fifth amendment compulsion. 302 Accordingly, the
denial of government contracts and the exclusion from certain occupations as sanctions
against an individual's choice to remain silent have been deemed compulsion because
they make claiming the fifth amendment privilege costly. 303 As the Doe court noted, and
the MPIRG dissent reaffirmed, the withholding of a person's financial means of receiving
a college education, especially where, as here, the plaintiffs have no other means with
which to attend college, is certainly a costly sanction in modern society, in terms of the
Supreme Court's historical protection of the right to remain silent. 904 Furthermore, as
the Doe court and the MPIRG dissent found, the denial of a college education is com-
mensurate to denying access to certain occupations, a sanction that the Court repeatedly
has deemed costly under fifth amendment principles. 306 Because the Supreme Court
consistently has held that compulsion occurs where the right to remain silent is made
costly, and because the denial of a college education unquestionably is costly, the Court
was misguided in its logic in MPIRG that the plaintiffs are not compelled to incriminate
themselves, however literally correct the Court was in its declaration that the plaintiffs
are not coerced into seeking financial aid.
The Supreme Court also denied in MPIRG that incriminating disclosures are re-
quired of non-registrants by the Solomon Amendment." 6 The Court ruled that because
non-registrants are ineligible for financial aid, they may not enter the application process,
and therefore, they have no occasion to file the statement of compliance which would
incriminate them."' The Court's holding begs the question, however, in light of the Doe
299 Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51,
300 Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 948; cf. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51.
3°1 See MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3365-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511,514-15 (1967)); see also Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 948, (citing Spevack, 385 U.S. at 514-15).
302 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (divesting political office holder of
his office deemed costly in terms of fifth amendment compulsion analysis); Lefkowitz v. Turley,
414 U.S. 70 (1973) (denial of public contracts to private businessperson deemed costly in terms of
fifth amendment compulsion); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (removal from one's job
deemed costly in terms of fifth amendment compulsion analysis); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967) (disbarment deemed a costly sanction under the fifth amendment compulsion component).
3" See supra note 301.
3°4 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3365 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 949.
3" See Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 947-49 (discussing Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977);
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); and Spevack
v, Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); see also MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3365 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing
Turley, 414 U.S. at 70; Garrity, 385 U.S. at 493; and Spevack, 385 U.S. at 511).
3°6
 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3358-59.




court's and MPIRG dissent's demonstration that the real issue is whether the plaintiffs
may be compelled to incriminate themselves once they have chosen to apply for financial
aid. 3°
Finally, the Court was faced with the plaintiffs' claim that if the escapability con-
struction were adopted, they would be forced to register late, thereby incriminating
themselves.'" The plaintiffs argued that in registering late they would have to disclose
their birthdates and registration dates, two of the three facts needed to prosecute them
for the felony of not registering within thirty days of their eighteenth birthdays. 3 '° The
Court disposed of this problem in two steps. The Court first found that, although late
registration is incriminating, the statement of compliance form is not, because, rather
than asking for the registrant's birthdate and registration date, it merely asks whether
the person has complied with the registration requirement.'" Secondly, the Court stated
that even though its escapability construction of the Solomon Amendment requires non-
registrants to register late, thereby furnishing the Selective Service System with incrim-
inating information, the plaintiffs in MPIRG, being non-registrants, have not registered
late.'" The Court held, therefore, that the plaintiffs' fifth amendment claim against this
late registration requirement is not ripe for review. 313 As will become apparent, both of
these justifications are not logically supportable.
First of all, the Court correctly stated that a late registrant does not have to furnish
his registration date and birthdate on the statement of compliance submitted to the
school.'" The Court failed to explain, however, how it is that a person who cannot
possibly comply with the draft registration law's requirement of registration within thirty
days of his eighteenth birthday once the thirty days have expired can legitimately file a
statement with his school, as required by the Solomon Amendment, that states that he
is in compliance with the draft registration law. 313
Furthermore, although obviously correct in stating the tautology that the non-
registrants have not registered,316 the Court failed to work logically through its ripeness
holding. That is, if the plaintiffs in MPIRG had registered late, the Court presumably
would have had to strike down the Solomon Amendment under the fifth amendment."'
One is forced to conclude therefore that the Supreme Court held that the Solomon
Amendment is constitutional because the specific plaintiffs who challenged the law had
not registered for the draft.
Moreover, in registering late, as required by the Supreme Court's own construction
of the statute, the plaintiffs would have to incriminate themselves, unless a person
somehow can register for the draft without answering the questions on the registration
form which ask a previously non-registered person his birthdate and registration date.'"
40" See supra text accompanying notes 299-301.
s09 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3358-59; see also supra text accompanying notes 218-19.
316 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3358-59; see also supra text accompanying notes 218-19.
5 " MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3358.
312 Id. at 3359.
313 Id.
514 See id. at 3352 n.2.
'Is See supra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
316 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3359.
317 This is so because the Court admitted that late registration is incriminatory and that the
opportunity for late registration is what saves the Solomon Amendment from constitutional attack.
Id. at 3358-59.
s' 8 See id. at 3366 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Through the very act of submitting a registration form without answering all of the
form's questions, however, as required by the Court's ruling in order to claim the fifth
amendment privilege, the plaintiffs would incriminate themselves by identifying them-
selves as some of the 700,000 individual violators of the draft registration law. It should
be remembered at this point that one of the government's major problems in enforcing
the draft registration law is the individual identification of the massive number of
violators. 319 In other words, for late registrants, the very act of claiming the fifth amend-
ment privilege would be incriminating.
Paradoxically, in Minnesota v. Murphy 320 decided just seven days prior to MPIRG,
the Supreme Court ruled that the only appropriate means of claiming the fifth amend-
ment privilege in cases where the very act of claiming it is incriminating is by silence. 32 '
That is, under Murphy, the MPIRC plaintiffs could only preserve their fifth amendment
privilege by silently refusing to register. 322 This is exactly what they did. 3 9 3 Nevertheless,
in MPIRG, the Court held that their fifth amendment claim is not ripe for review. 324 As
a result, the Court created a trap from which the plaintiffs cannot escape. 325 Even if the
plaintiffs somehow register late without answering the incriminating questions, as the
Court implied that they must do in order to receive financial aid, Murphy precludes them
from claiming the fifth amendment privilege as it relates to identifying themselves as
law breakers. 320 As the MPIRG disent pointed out, the plaintiffs are left with the choice
of not registering tate and as a result losing the opportunity to go to college, or registering
late, thereby incriminating themselves of a crime for which the penalty is up to five years
in jail and up to $10,000 in fines. 327
Again, rather than choosing to affirm the district court's holding striking down the
statute, the Supreme Court chose to defer to the political will of Congress. 329 Unlike the
district court, 329 the Supreme Court declined to separate its constitutional duties from
its political inclinations. 330 As politically or even morally unacceptable as a person's
decision not to register for the draft may be, the Supreme Court is obliged by the
Constitution to protect that decision from unconstitutional infringement by Congress. 331
Here, Congress sought to enforce the legitimate draft registration law in an illegitimate
way. 332 In the Solomon Amendment, it created a scheme of enforcement whereby vio-
lators of the law are compelled to incriminate themselves. 333 The Supreme Court simply
chose not to be there to protect from compelled self-incrimination the individuals in the
group singled out for punishment by Congress who have no other means of receiving a
college education.
319 See id,
320 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984).
321 See id. at 1 149 n.R.
322 See id.
525 MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3359.
524 Id.
323 See id. at 3367-68 (Marshall. J., dissenting).
"b Id. at 3368 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
327 Id. at 3365 n.15.3367-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
528 See id. at 3357.
329 Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 938-39,950.
33° See MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3357.
", Id. at 3361 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
332 Id.
333 Id.
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C. A Retreat from Judicial Enforcement of
Constitutional Protections of Individual Rights
The Supreme Court in MPIRG held that the Solomon Amendment is neither a
violation of the bill of attainder clause nor of the self-incrimination clause despite citing
with approval the same cases on which the district court relied in reaching the opposite
result." In light of the controlling authority, which it declined to distinguish, narrow
or overrule overtly, and in light of the explicit terms of the Solomon Amendment itself,
constitutionally, the Supreme Court's reversal of the district court was misguided.
With its faulty construction of the statute, the Supreme Court achieved its desired
result"' of upholding Congress' denial of financial aid for college to those who do not
register for the draft, while apparently not upsetting the controlling precedent in bill of
attainder and self-incrimination constitutional jurisprudence. However comfortable the
Court was with the proposition that young men should share in the responsibilities as
well as the privileges of citizenship, the Court should not have upheld the Solomon
Amendment. It is the judiciary's unique function in American government, as the only
non-elected branch, to ignore political considerations and enforce the Constitution." 6
In MPIRG the Supreme Court seemed unwilling to do this. Instead, the Court chose to
take a hands-off attitude towards a politically difficult, but constitutionally clear, contro-
versy.
The plaintiffs in MPIRG did not question Congress' power to enforce draft regis-
tration or to punish non-registration. Rather, they asked the Court to see to it that, in
enforcing the law, Congress not overstep the procedural hounds of the Constitution.
Like the Supreme Court, the district court found the substance of the Solomon Amend-
ment non-offensive." 7 The procedure, however, whereby the legislature determined guilt
and inflicted punishment on a specific group without the protections of a judicial trial,
with the help of coerced written confessions, was deemed constitutionally offensive by
the district court,""" as it should have been by the Supreme Court. The bill of attainder
and self-incrimination clauses are, after all, two of the most significant protections of the
fundamental liberties of the individual against the ever more present and ever more
powerful federal government. The Supreme Court, however, refused to separate the
political acceptability of the substance of the law from constitutionally mandated pro-
cedural standards."" Unfortunately, the Court's value-laden, constitutionally-blind ap-
proach has implications far beyond the issue of whether young men, who made moral
decisions which may prove unpopular, constitutionally may be deprived of an opportu-
nity to attend college with the help of financial aid from the federal government.
In separating the powers among the three co-equal branches of government, the
Framers sought to protect individual liberties.") By specifically mandating that the
'" See supra notes 241,244,274 & 286.
5" See supra text accompanying notes 280-86.
"6 See supra notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
"7 Doe, 557 F. Supp. at 938-39,950.
' See supra text accompanying notes 280-81.
5" See MPIRG, 104 S. Ct. at 3363 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
340 In discussing the importance of the bill of attainder clause, the Supreme Court has declared:
The proper scope of the bill of attainder clause, and its relevance to contemporary
problems, must ultimately be sought by attempting to discern the reasons for its
inclusion in the Constitution, and the evils it was designed to eliminate. The best
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legislature is to pass laws of general applicability, that the executive is to prosecute
violators of those laws within stringent procedural guidelines, and that the judiciary is
to adjudicate individual cases through impartial tribunals, the Framers sought to protect
the rights of the individual, however unpopular, from encroachment by the legislature
and the executive, each of which is purposely accountable to the political process. 341 The
two political acts which created the Solomon Amendment, the President's reactivation
of draft registration and the Congress' tying of draft registration to federal financial aid
funds, seem potentially justifiable political judgments for the two political branches to
be persuaded to make. The judiciary, however, is supposed to be insulated from such
political pressures.
Upholding the Solomon Amendment in the face of valid constitutional attacks seems
to be the third of three politically expedient acts of government which now present men
presumed disloyal by Congress with the deprivation of the right to attend college if they
cannot afford to attend on their own. It was the fear of this very notion of political
expediency, nonetheless, which led the Framers to create the federal judiciary as a check
on legislative and executive powers. At the Supreme Court's worst moments, such as
when it endorsed the slavery of black Ameiicans in Dred Scott v. Sanford,342 and when it
upheld the internment of Japanese Americans in Korematsu v. United States, 54 ' the Court
capitulated to the pressure from which the Framers, with their extensive system of
checks and balances, sought to shelter the rights of the individual. The Framers con-
sciously made the choice to protect procedurally the guilty as well as the innocent, and
the unpopular as well as the popular. 314 In its greatest moments, the Supreme Court has
accepted this unparallelled challenge of American jurisprudence by refusing to succumb
to political pressures. The Court has declared many times that even the slightest deviation
from a strict interpretation and application of the procedural protections of the Consti-
tution necessarily begins the gradual. but sure deterioration of the fundamental rights
of the individua1. 345 Unfortunately, the Court rejected this tradition in MPIRG. Although
this case surely will not draw as much criticism as the Dred Scott and Korematsu cases have
available evidence, the writings of the architects of our constitutional system, indicates
that the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore
soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation
of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or
more simply — trial by legislature.
Brown, 381 U.S. at 442.
	 •
34 ' See id. at 443; see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-5, at 491-92 (1978).
3" 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
34t 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
5" See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956).
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967). In discussing the importance of the fifth
amendment's protection of the individual against compelled self-incrimination, the Court stated:
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely,
by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can
only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security
of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction
deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as
if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroach-
ments thereon."
Id. (quoting United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
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drawn, it does signal a disturbing direction of deference to the political will of Congress
by the Supreme Court. The constitutional attacks on the Solomon Amendment under
the bill of attainder and self-incrimination clauses may have been highly technical pro-
cedural attacks against a statute whose substance is otherwise non-offensive. Nevertheless,
it is the duty of the Supreme Court of the United States to adhere to the Constitution's
procedural protections of liberty, especially when asserted by a seemingly unpopular
. person, for a seemingly unpopular cause.
CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, which conditions federal financial
aid for college on registration for the draft and which requires financial aid applicants
to submit to their schools draft registration compliance forms, was upheld by the Su-
preme Court in MPIRG. Reversing the decision in Doe of the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota, the Supreme Court held in MPIRG that the Solomon
Amendment violates neither the bill of attainder clause nor the self-incrimination clause
of the United States Constitution.
In its bill of attainder analysis, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its precedent which
defines a bill of attainder as a law which legislatively, and without judicial process,
determines the guilt of and levies punishment on an identifiable person or group.
Turning to the facts in MPIRG, the Court acknowledged that, in passing the Solomon
Amendment, Congress legislatively, and without judicial process, determined the guilt
of non-registrants, thereby meeting the first element of prohibited bills of attainder. The
Court found, however, that the Amendment's deprivation — the denial of financial aid
to non-registrants — is escapable by late registration. Consequently, the Court concluded
that the second and third elements of the bill of attainder proscription — punishment
and specificity — are not met because the escapable statute properly regulates the future
conduct of a presently unidentifiable group, rather than impermissibly punishes the
specific, identifiable group of present non-registrants for their past conduct. That is, since
it found that Congress passed a law of general applicability, which encourages future
legal conduct yet which does not punish past illegal conduct, the Court reversed the
district court in Doe and declared that the Solomon Amendment is not a bill of attainder.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in MPIRG reaffirmed its fifth amendment precedent,
ruling that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is applicable to situations,
like that potentially created by the Solomon Amendment, in which individuals are
compelled to disclose to the government, in writing, facts which could incriminate them.
Applying this precedent to the facts of MPIRG, however, the Court found neither the
requisite compulsion nor the requisite incrimination that the district court found in Doe.
The Supreme Court first found that the compulsion component is lacking in the scheme
of the Amendment because Congress did not compel non-registrants to invoke the
provisions of the statute by applying for financial aid. The Court reasoned that since
non-registrants, therefore, are not compelled to do anything by the statute, they could
not have been compelled to incriminate themselves. The Court went on to find that the
information required by the Solomon Amendment is not even incriminatory. Because
the statute only applies to eligible financial aid applicants — that is, those who have
complied with the draft registration law — the Court continued, the statute's compliance
form could not possibly incriminate the applicants. Finally, the Court rejected the notion
that its escapability by late registration construction produced a cognizable self-incrimi-
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nation issue. Although it recognized that late registration is incriminating, the Court
ruled that this claim is not ripe for review because the plaintiffs in MPIRG have not
registered and thus have no occasion to raise the fifth amendment as it relates to the act
of late registration. Accordingly, the MPIRG Court reversed the district court in Doe and
held that the Solomon Amendment is not. violative of the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination.
Despite reaching a result which may seem palatable to many observers who believe
that young men should register for the draft, and should not receive federal aid for
college if they do not so register, the MPIRG Court abused its judicial role in reversing
the Doe court and countenancing the Solomon Amendment based on its own contempt
for draft registration resisters. Though it clearly articulated its sympathy for the political
decision reached by Congress in passing the legislation, the Supreme Court failed to
explain lucidly its seeming misapplication of precedent and its manifestly errant statutory
construction. That the Court firmly endorsed its Cummings-Brown precedent as control-
ling, while ruling that the Amendment is not a bill of attainder because it is escapable,
is perplexing in light of the fact that Cummings and Brown both staunchly held that
escapability does not save a statute from bill of attainder attack. Likewise, one is hard
pressed to discern the Court's unexplained rationale for "interpreting" a statute which
states that a man is ineligible for financial aid if he fails to register by a certain date as
escapable, where that man registers after that certain date.
'The Court's fifth amendment analysis is troubling as well. By ruling that the plaintiffs
are not compelled to incriminate themselves, the Court in effect held that the denial of
the opportunity to attend college is not costly, in terms of government sanctions against
an individual's exercise of her constitutional rights. Finally, its attempt to save the statute
from bill of attainder attack by "construing" the deprivation as escapable led the Court
to reason circularly, for fifth amendment purposes, that although late registration is
required of non-registrants, the plaintiffs, being non-registrants, have no fifth amend-
ment privilege to challenge the future incriminatory act of late registration.
Because the Court's holding is based in its entirety on a strained construction of the
statute, as well as on a tenuous application of law, the precedential value of MPIRG in
terms of the bill of attainder clause and the self-incrimination clause is difficult to discern.
Nevertheless, the Court's willingness to abdicate its judicial function by deferring to the
Congress and to the President its role as guardian of constitutional protections against
legislative and executive abuse, unfortunately, sets an ominous "precedent."
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